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A B S T R A C T   
Where we may be aware that a problem exists, but have only an incomplete description of the 
drivers and/or possible management solutions, we will be unaware/uncertain about future 
returns from, and risks to, private and public investments in capital (i.e. social, natural, economic, 
cultural and political). This paper explores the unawareness/uncertainty problem by coupling 
Arrow’s states of nature approach for dealing with uncertainty with Rothschild and Stiglitz’s 
exploration of inputs and increasing risk. This results in a modified Just-Pope production function 
equation isolating inputs to i) protect base capital (natural, social or private) and/or ii) generate 
an output. By exploring water input supply unawareness via alternative states of nature we may 
identify tipping points where current technology fails, resulting in irreversible losses of private 
and public capital tied to water inputs. We conclude by discussing the value of quantifying 
minimum-input requirements and identifying critical tipping-point outcomes in water systems, 
increased benefits/risks from transformed landscapes chasing higher economic returns, and the 
need for adaptive public arrangements in response. These insights may help us to understand 
future risk to natural capital from rising incentives to steal increasingly constrained resources that 
may trigger revised risk-sharing arrangements, and some limits to analyses relying on perfect 
foresight requirements by decision-makers.   
1. Introduction 
Where we may be aware that a problem exists, but have only an incomplete description of the drivers and/or possible management 
solutions, we will be uncertain about future returns from and risks to private and public investments in capital (i.e. social, natural, 
economic, cultural and political). Incomplete descriptions of problems or their outcomes limit applications of standard expected utility 
paradigms [1] where there will be insufficient observations of outcomes to inform beneficial decision-making. As a consequence, 
investors considering long-lived benefits and costs, irreversibilities and unique one-time investments may favour real-option ap-
proaches as a basis for decision-making [2]. However, this is usually only true for a small number of projects (ibid.), and in the majority 
of cases decision-makers must compare the probability of future failure with the probability of achieving minimum required rewards to 
assess risk-reduction given the uncertainty of future shocks [3]. 
An example of this problem is any complex agricultural and environmental choice reliant on (increasingly) uncertain water inputs 
to exist and function. Water risk and uncertainty could arise through increased unawareness via changes to the frequency of current 
state (e.g. drought, flood) occurrences [4], the reality that expected future water supply states will evolve [5], and/or a need to explore 
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how current management solutions may fail in response [1]—or tipping-points in existing institutional arrangements. Herein we 
define risk as known-knowns [6] that can be described with some certainty via a probability distribution; for example, a water 
entitlement right with expected probability of receiving a full allocation in 90% of years. By contrast, we treat uncertainty as a 
known-unknown that fundamentally changes (identifies) existing (new) probability distributions that trigger altered management 
responses; for example, new climatic arrangements that reduce the previous reliability of allocations to 65% of years—but with un-
certainty as to if/when this may occur.1 When such positive/negative water supply is realised, water demand may be dramatically 
altered and optimal management solutions difficult to identify (e.g. non-convex outcomes) under a motivation by decision-makers to 
protect capital investments. 
The greater the uncertainty (i.e. known-unknowns), the risker a future water investment becomes and the greater the need to 
identify risk-sharing or mitigating opportunities. In such representations, decision-maker behaviour will evolve in response to varied 
states of nature (e.g. drought, flood events) enabling analysts to explore any limits associated with bounded rationality from insuf-
ficient observations in support of choices [7]. This may allow analysts to identify how people inform decisions via self-discovery or 
heuristics [8], and some clarity when compared with standard expected utility function applications where decision-makers may be 
incapable of accurately distributing probabilities to alternative state occurrences [9]. Such analysis also provides some capacity to 
explore decision-maker awareness of current/possible future state outcomes, knowledge about relevant rules of the game, and how 
learning to manage current/possible state outcomes drives eventual decision-making [10]. Possible state outcomes may thus occur in 
individual or combined forms, as alternative descriptions of previous states, or novel management solutions about which 
decision-makers were previously unaware [3]. As such, we may be able to explore how decision-makers might adapt to sudden and/or 
altered states, rather than expected outcomes. 
In this paper we focus specifically on how any failure to understand or appreciate the consequences ofsudden tipping points (e.g. 
the over-allocation of scarce and variable resource inputs given unawareness with respect to thresholds) may lead to irreversible 
capital loss outcomes [11].2 Our motivation for this study draws on numerous recent examples of management response failures in the 
water sector where decision-makers have been ‘surprised’ by changes to both the frequency of states of nature and evolutions in the 
volume of water supplied (i.e. the description of the state), and have rapidly adapted to avoid irreversible consequences. In Cape Town, 
South Africa, after three years of drought (2015–2017) domestic water supplies were near fully exhausted. Through severe water 
restrictions, and a significant rainfall event, a critical ‘day-zero’ outcome of municipal supply being shut off was narrowly avoided. A 
similar period of drought (2015–2017) resulted in the Alqueva Dam in Portugal, Europe’s largest water storage facility, reaching 
critically low levels. This threatened water supplies to perennial (e.g. olive and almond) irrigators who had been guaranteed annual 
water allocations. Some restrictions were possible and applied, but ultimately a significant rainfall event prevented large-scale capital 
loss. Finally, a six year drought event in California, United States, (2011–2017) reduced surface water availability for irrigation and 
municipal users forcing greater consumption of groundwater. With groundwater aquifers already heavily depleted, increased usage 
resulted in land subsidence and an estimated irreversible loss of 2% of the aquifer storage [12]. As the relevant institutions battled to 
manage the issue, and to come up with solutions for water-users, a break in the drought meant that supply was reinstated and the 
pressure to reform was reduced. 
These cases illustrate a common theme, where current institutions and infrastructure are being tested to meet the existing demands 
for water under increasing requirements to deal with new and uncertain water supply patterns. Increased water supply uncertain-
ty—and/or inappropriate institutional/management arrangements for dealing with scarcity—may therefore drive systems to rapidly 
approach or exceed critical tipping points resulting in capital (i.e. social, economic, cultural and natural) losses. Increased experience 
of such outcomes is forcing radical change in management, adaptation, adoption and/or cropping choice sets to prevent water sup-
plies/systems reaching critical failure, but from a reactive rather that proactive perspective. On reflection, all water managers should 
be questioning how these tipping points were so rapidly reached, could more have been done to identify these tipping points in 
advance, and what additional/radical future management change or strategies may now be needed. These answers are not straight-
forward and involve finer-scale commodity data over a long historical record if dynamic change is to be analysed [13], and repre-
sentations of real world complexity tied closely to an improved capacity to represent and incorporate unawareness/uncertainty into 
institutional arrangements and assessments of future risk [1]. 
However, risk and uncertainty do not typically feature in public policy and/or private assessments of the future, especially in terms 
of investments; even as many contexts commit globally to programs aimed at increased efficiency in the extraction and consumption of 
water resources. This may be because the means to represent unawareness/uncertainty in decision-making is difficult, creating 
challenges for properly discounting future effects on our current enjoyment of resources, and/or deliberate disregard of any ‘un-
comfortable’ and/or dynamic information via denial, dismissal, design and displacement [14]. Therefore, in this paper we examine 
how risk/uncertainty has been considered in past investment and irreversible loss assessments based on representations of water input 
use as a combination of additive risk (where any reliance on additional water inputs increases exposure uniformly, which we term (g)) 
and multiplicative risk (where decisions to use additional inputs depends on the decision-makers’ relative risk aversion function, which 
we term (h)), and the limits to those approaches. We then outline a framework based on stochastic states of nature that is being applied 
to represent state outcomes as either greater/less than some defined threshold, which can accommodate tipping-point concepts. This 
approach advances our thinking about the role of water as (g) and (h) inputs to explore investment risk, decision-making, and the need 
1 For simplicity this article ignores unknown-unknowns; that is, events about which we have no information.  
2 This article follows Arrow & Fisher’s (1974) definition of irreversible loss which may be both immediately permanent and/or subsequent due to 
a positive rate of time required for regeneration that essentially makes the loss irreversible. 
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to better identify critical thresholds. We further argue that an appreciation of (g) and (h) water input requirements improves our 
understanding of proximity to critical tipping points, better informs capital investment risk exposure, and highlights the importance of 
flexible institutions/policies to manage increasingly uncertain futures. 
2. Representing uncertainty in decision-making 
When exploring unawareness and uncertainty with respect to water resources it is important to realise that supply uncertainty is 
inversely correlated with the total demand for production inputs; that is, the less water that is available the greater the total demand for 
scarce resources. As the future becomes more difficult to predict (e.g. climate change impacts on both the supply and demand for 
water), a combination of decision-maker unawareness with respect to appropriate responses (i.e. behavioural adaptation to incomplete 
sets of information) and natural constraints within our existing institutions to deal with future realised (lower) supplies of inputs, may 
drive us rapidly towards tipping points that result in irreversible loss. 
In general terms, a tipping point is one at which a small change or incident becomes important enough to cause larger, more 
significant (potentially exponential or non-convex) change, requiring critical decision-making in response. Examples in the literature 
frequently discuss socio-political regimes [15], climate systems [16], disease epidemics [17], safety parameters [18], and leverage 
points for public intervention [19]. Tipping points can also be thought of as a discontinuity between current and future states, based on 
the probability of future state distributions [20]. It is the future state distribution notion of tipping points that provides a basis for the 
thinking in this paper. We can begin our discussion using a [21] production function (Equation (1)) that explores the output (z) of a 
given system from the use of a single input (x): 
z¼ gðxÞ þ hðxÞε (1) 
The Just-Pope production function describes both additive risk gðxÞ, where the distribution of outputs is not linked to the use of 
inputs, and multiplicative risk hðxÞε where the distribution of outputs is directly linked to the use of inputs. In this case, the error term 
ðεÞ is often derived from historical data, where established (i.e. known) mean-variance values parameterise a probability distribution 
function in a Monte-Carlo simulation. Just and Pope [22,23] later challenged the use of mean-variance approaches to stylise risk 
and/or uncertainty in their reviews of stochastic production functions. Rothschild and Stiglitz [24,25] also noted the limits of relying 
on mean and variance by exploring outcomes from choosing between variables that have the same expected value, but different 
distributions. Their critical finding was that decision-makers who fail to understand alternative weights in the distribution of tails may 
choose riskier, rather than safer, investments. Further, while the notion of representing risk and/or uncertainty as a deviation around a 
mean number may be appealing for partial equilibrium analysis, Rothenberg and Smith [26] explored how uncertainty alone impacted 
resource/input allocations within a general equilibrium model. The adoption of the general equilibrium approach allowed for an 
exploration of feedbacks on the allocation of capital to maximise profits in response to uncertainty represented by a production 
function with a random parameter. Three of their findings (ibid., p 458) are useful for considering long-term capital investment 
outcomes: (i) short-run production flexibility provides the greatest protection against uncertainty; (ii) national income tends to fall if 
the production function has a random variable with diminishing returns, but increases when a ‘plausible’ production function involves 
a multiplicative random parameter; and (iii) while uncertainty thus decreases aggregate income, the economy will experience both 
winners and losers. Put another way, the use (allocation) of water inputs can be risk-increasing, risk-decreasing, and/or shared 
inequitably based on the nature of the capital investment. 
2.1. The state contingent approach to representing uncertainty 
Past exploration of risk-increasing and risk-decreasing inputs based on mean-variance and changes to asset net returns can provide 
misleading outcomes, that may expose public/private investment options to tipping points and irreversible loss outcomes. How then 
might that assessment change if we accounted for a future state in which necessary water inputs cannot be reliably sourced (i.e. there is 
no supply)? We suggest that a state-contingent analysis (SCA) framework offers effective approaches for considering such risk/un-
certainty (unawareness). The SCA framework broadly allows exploration of how decision-makers’ behavioural responses change for 
realised state outcomes. Further, the SCA framework can enable existing institutional arrangements to be tested for suitability in 
response to realised or predicted future states; that is, identifying where institutions may fail to provide appropriate adaptations to 
changes in state descriptions, and/or frequency of occurrence. Insights learned may suggest the need for altered behavioural re-
sponses/institutions as a consequence. 
Early studies used the term ‘states of nature’ when discussing investment choices under risk/uncertainty. Original work undertaken 
by Arrow [27] and Debreu [28] examined how decision-makers respond to realised state outcomes (e.g. drought/flood events). 
Hirshleifer [29,30] further articulated differences between dominant mean-variance approaches for representing risk and uncertainty 
and state of nature approaches to inform investment choice theory. According to Hirshleifer [29], state of nature approaches reduced 
the “vagueness” (pg. 534) associated with other uncertainty methodologies, allowing decision-makers to identify both the natural 
endowments in a given state and any additional required factors of production to obtain an output in that state. Chambers and Quiggin 
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[31] extended the state of nature approach by merging it with dual optimisation to illustrate how resources can be used to optimise 
input use in all states by time, place and type [32].3 This established what is now known as the state-contingent analysis (SCA) 
approach. In SCA models nature ðΩÞ defines the complete uncertainty space, and Ω can be divided into a series of states of nature ðsÞ to 
define real and mutually-exclusive sets (S) which describe that uncertainty ðΩ ¼ f1; 2; …; s;…;SgÞ. Importantly, the decision-maker 
has no ability to influence which s occurs. Further, a decision-makers’ subjective belief about the frequency/probability ðπÞ of each s 
occurring is a vector described by ðπ ¼ π1; …; πsÞ. However, for each s the decision-maker has a set of management options for 
alternative production systems (technology). This can be represented (Equation (2)) by a “continuous input correspondence, X : RSþ → 
R
N




x ​ 2 ​ RNþ : x ​ can ​ produce ​ z
�
​ : (2) 
For each s, the vector of inputs x ¼ ðx1;::;xNÞ, their prices w ¼ ðw1;::;wNÞ, and output prices p are known so that revenue can now be 
represented as: 
vs¼ zsps8s 2 Ω; : (3)  
while costs are also now represented as: 
cs¼wsxs8s 2 Ω; (4)  
and expected net profit across nature Ω is: 
E½Y� ​ ¼ ​
X
s2Ω
π ​ ðv   cÞ ​ :8s 2 Ω: (5) 
Under the above conditions and with perfect foresight regarding inputs, input prices and output prices—and where the decision- 
maker’s management responses to alternative s doesn’t alter—we are able to collapse the total nature set Ω. Then, once s is realised, 
there is no vagueness about how decision-makers should respond. As such, not only is risk/uncertainty completely described, but 
decision-makers actively respond to that risk/uncertainty by reallocating inputs to obtain known returns. 
This combination of completely describing the risk/uncertainty and its outcomes limits the positive/negative impact of unknown- 
unknowns. This is because when parameterising risk/uncertainty, unknown-unknowns can only be either greater than, or less than, the 
chosen parameter. For example, in the case where total supply of water (i.e. quantity of water) is the source of risk/uncertainty, the 
state outcome can only result in more or less water than was expected. However, the severity of the realised water supply outcome may 
suggest better future technologies for adoption/adaptation in response. Consequently, sensitivity analysis could play a role in 
determining the thresholds at which existing technologies and institutional frameworks fail. At those failure (tipping) points, if new 
technologies emerge over time then a new set of s may be required, expanding the total nature set Ω. 
2.2. Rethinking total input uncertainty 
We can now return to the Just-Pope production function (Equation (1)) specifying output as a function of inputs to underline the 
importance of thinking about water inputs differently. Recall that inputs in a Just-Pope production function include additive (g) and 
multiplicative (h) risk. Chambers and Quiggin [34] respecified the Just-Pope production function into an SCA format as zs ¼ gðxÞþ
hðxÞs;ε showing that stochastic information may help to explain adaptive decision-maker responses to revealed states of nature. 
Following that approach, Mallawaararchchi et al. [35] further modified Chambers and Quiggin’s equation into zs ¼ ζs þ hðxÞs;ε, where 
variability is derived from the natural resource base (land quality/Ricardian rent) ζs, together with a multiplicative risk derived from a 
vector of inputs (including water). This model was used to explain dairy farmer adaptation during drought. Also in the context of 
drought adaptation, Adamson et al. [36] separated water inputs into two distinct types: i) water used to generate outputs and ii) water 
used to maintain perennial production systems (i.e. keep them alive)—although they did not specify this mathematically. Herein, we 
merge the concepts from Mallawaarachchi et al. [35] and Adamson et al. [36] allowing a further modification of the SCA production 
function to separately account for maintenance and productive water inputs as shown in Equation (6): 
zs¼ ζsþ gðxÞs;ε þ hðxÞs;ε: (6) 
The equation illustrates how z is produced by each s on a given land area, using a combination of additive risk from natural soil 
fertility ðζÞ and two multiplicative risk signals for inputs ðxÞ: minimum water inputs required to keep the capital invested in production 
systems alive ðgÞ, and inputs required to generate output categories ðhÞ. The addition of an error term ðεÞ for ðgÞ beyond Chambers and 
Quiggin’s original equation is deliberate to account for the decision-makers’ unawareness of maintenance inputs required in each 
state. The error term can also represent any uncertainty over a decision-makers’ attitude to risk. For example, a risk averse producer 
3 Refers to three input types: (i) non-state-specific (or state-general) inputs that must be allocated ex-ante to the s being realised, and which 
influence z in all s; (ii) state-specific inputs that are applied ex-post to the realisation of s; and which influence z in only that s; and (iii) state 
allocable (flexible) inputs (costs) that are applied ex-ante to s being realised, but where benefits accrue once s is realised. 
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may over-estimate ðgÞ water requirements, thus contributing in part to ðhÞ water requirements. Logically the equation could also 
include additive risk from water for greater explanatory power. 
We contend that this relatively simple separation of inputs into ðgÞ capital-preserving water and ðhÞ productive water to generate 
output categories extends beyond the simple game-theoretic approach used by Adamson et al. [36], providing a powerful illustration of 
a range of issues relevant to water resource users, managers and policy-makers worldwide. Critically, a better quantification of 
minimum gðxÞ input requirements enables more informed decision-making, as well as some improved capacity to compare and 
contrast available policy options—particularly with regard to future uncertainty/unawareness and resource tipping points. In the next 
section we expand upon these initial concepts to explore total input availability, how decision-making adjustments may be required 
when inputs reduce by state, and the importance of tipping points in systems for informing a range of future public/private 
decision-making. 
3. Theoretical relevance of fixed (g) input requirements 
We begin with our consideration of total water input availability (supply), which is conditional upon the revealed state of nature s 
within a stochastic supply distribution. Each state has an independent distribution curve which represents the probability of occur-
rence as well as the stochastic supply of water likely during such events. Some states (s2) may have a relatively moderate probability of 
occurrence, but result in a significant quantity of input resources. Other state outcomes (s3) have both a lower probability but with a 
reduced total input availability. Importantly, note the minimum (g) and maximum (g*) input requirements illustrated by the solid 
arrowed line at the base of the Figure, and the vertical dashed lines at the extreme tails of the outcome distributions. These indicate the 
point at which no further inputs can be used by the system to facilitate productive outputs (g*), or the absolute minimum inputs 
required to maintain the capital base (g)—hence the distance between a zero input availability and the minimum (g) requirement in 
Fig. 1. 
For example, this could be thought of as the minimum water required to keep a rootstock alive for current and future production. If 
we treat (g) as the minimum then, as stated earlier, all available (h) inputs by state above that water requirement can be used to 
facilitate productive outputs. The sum of (g) and (h) inputs will therefore fall along the solid line between the zero-intercept and (g*). 
However, it follows that if total supply is reduced, then—as long as (g) water input requirements are met—some reallocation at the 
margin of available (h) inputs will have to occur (e.g. reductions in input allocation between users as total availability falls from hb to hc 
in Fig. 2). To achieve this, the system must have some capacity for flexibility in its design and arrangements (e.g. market-based 
mechanisms to reallocate resources between users). 
Importantly, in s3 the system is moving closer to minimum input requirements (g). If total input availability falls beyond that 
tipping point then irreversible capital (i.e. natural, social, cultural and economic) losses may eventuate. We can think about this 
another way. If we consider total input demand (D) for (h) inputs by state against total water input supply (x), we can match that to 
total input availability and movements towards minimum (g) requirement levels as total input availability shrinks (LHS of Fig. 3). This 
shows the positive/negative (as illustrated by the arrows) tipping points between state outcomes, but that all states of nature are 
grounded by the minimum (g) input requirement (red-dashed line above the grey-shaded area). We could envisage the grey-shaded 
area as minimum input requirements in water systems for ecological base flows and/or conveyance water requirements to ensure 
system operation. 
From this we can identify how tipping points or changes to the total (g) input requirement in particular will result in (i) a significant 
need for trade-offs among existing (new) users, (ii) an increasing requirement for the implementation of adaptive private/public 
systems to facilitate reallocations (where currently not available), else (iii) irreversible capital losses will result. To illustrate this point, 
let us shrink our focus to the fixed (g) requirements from total available inputs indicated by the dotted red lines in Fig. 4. If the sum of 
demand for inputs is less than the total available supply (Fig. 4a), the more flexibility the system enjoys to cope with shock or changed 
state events. As the system approaches the minimum threshold (tipping point – Fig. 4b), its capacity to cope will be reduced 
Fig. 1. Total input availability by stochastic state, with min/max (g) requirements.  
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respectively, and the probability of significant change will be increased. If the system breaches the tipping point (Fig. 4c)—recalling 
that this can result in rapid and exponential change—capital exposure will also grow exponentially, and the system will likely fail. 
System failures will be especially significant where the minimum water input requirements relate to identified critical functions (e.g. 
ecological, as shown here in the grey shaded area). Where these requirements are fundamentally breached, all other system functions 
will likely fail under a cascading impact effect, resulting in multiplicative capital losses—which may also perversely increase during 
Fig. 2. (g) trade-off requirements under constrained total inputs in new state.  
Fig. 3. Total (g) and (h) input supply/demand by state outcome.  
Fig. 4. Positive and negative tipping points for (g) input requirements.  
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low supply conditions [37]. A critical point to note is that tipping point breaches of the system in this example impact heaviest during 
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3.1. An empirical example 
We have stated that this simple illustrative theory is both powerful and important for the users, managers and policy-makers of 
resource systems. As an example of the power of these concepts we next examine the transformation that has occurred in the Australian 
almond industry over the last two decades (Fig. 5). Perennial crops such as almonds require substantial capital investment, and survive 
for decades. They cannot be fallowed during drought without significant economic losses resulting in demand hardening for critical 
inputs [38], but they also generate more revenue per unit of water used [39]. Our illustrative Australian example explores how the 
changing demand for (g) water inputs has rapidly increased as fruit-bearing trees (or those aged six years and older) have reached 
maturity. It seems likely that during the height of the Millennium Drought (2005–06 to 2008–09) several factors—comparatively high 
almond commodity prices, severe restrictions on the supply of agricultural water, and government packages to structurally adjust-
—combined to transform land use from traditional cropping (e.g. 35% reduction in winegrapes between 2005 and 2017 [40]) to new 
almond plantings with lower water requirements until fully matured (i.e. new perennial plantings). 
Between 2005 and 2008, new plantings comprised up to 30% of total area. This resulted in a step-change, and by 2011 production 
had reached around 58,000 kernel tonnes. By 2020, the almond industry estimates that production will be around 100,000 kernel 
tonnes, requiring an area of about 48,000 ha of trees [41]. We note that the linear demand trend line superimposed onto Fig. 5 (dotted 
line) may suggest a change in total water requirements leading toward a potential tipping point, dependent upon where that (g)-input 
supply point might be. 
In fact, the almond industry does have some idea with respect to tipping-point water supply levels. In the United States studies have 
set a minimum (g) for almonds crops at 50% of total water inputs [13]. For Australia Brown [42] suggests a tipping-point of 
3.80 megalitres (ML ¼ one million litres or 0.810 acre-foot) per hectare (Ha), and that most growers prefer to have at least 5.04ML/Ha 
as a minimum supply to prevent future yield losses. On the basis of industry estimates suggesting mature irrigated crops in Australia 
consume 14ML/Ha [41], using this figure and the number of hectares planted over time we can see that the industry has a (g) tipping 
point of approximately 26% of typical water supply, and a preferred minimum supply of at least 36%. This allows us to calculate a 
Fig. 5. Growth in almond fruit-bearing trees in Australia, 2002 to 2020 (forecast).  
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range of g-water requirements across the above industry planting values to identify minimum supply values to maintain industry 
perennial rootstock (Fig. 6). We can note an initial step-wise shift in the (g)-water requirements following new plantings in 2003, then 
later step-wide shifts which have increased potential water requirements between 85 GL (GL, or billion megalitres) and 120 GL in 
2007, to between 176 GL (26%) and 244 GL (36%) by 2020. The slightly more pronounced exponential increase from 2015 to 2020 
based on industry forecasts is particularly worrying in this regard. 
However, we do not fully understand: how this changes for almond crop planting density differences; different scales (i.e. basin, 
catchment or local area); how this may be affected by scope issues such as efficiency changes or sectoral adjustment incentives; how 
different users may adapt and adjust independently in the face of uncertain outcomes; and/or how climate change may impact upon 
these issues to shift water supply and demand in the future. This provides us with a great deal of future uncertainty that must be 
addressed urgently. As the Australian almond industry experiences step changes in water demand to service now largely matured tree- 
stocks, during periods of low water supply many (new industry) decision-makers will likely be unaware of their total set of adaptation 
management strategies. In the short-run, this may lead to a willingness to pay prices well above market average to secure water inputs 
and preserve capital [36]. However, if those markets are unable to fully satisfy water demand, decision-makers faced with extreme 
downside risk [43] may feel justified in extracting water illegally from other users, including the environment. This may place 
increased pressure on existing institutions to protect non-economic rights and prevent natural, social and cultural capital losses. 
Alternatively, in the absence of these two former solutions, farm decision-makers may create a substantial rural debt bomb which may 
ultimately have to be met by national interventions, as the insurer of last resort. These issues are expanded upon in the next section. 
4. Discussion 
The theory and basic empirical analysis outlined above suggest a number of issues that could drive a future research agenda. These 
issues include: 
4.1. Increased incorporation of uncertainty into investment assessments 
Here we return to our earlier discussion of state contingent analysis (SCA) as a useful tool for incorporating uncertainty/un-
awareness into models of resource use and decision-making, and for informing future choices. The recent improvements discussed in 
Section 2.2 above which define uncertainty/unawareness outcomes that are greater or less than a minimum (g) ‘tipping point’ enable 
analysts to better optimise allocation choices for various constraints or objectives. Alternatively, reversing the process—that is, 
specifying a management strategy in advance and evaluating it against tipping point outcomes—is also possible. However, both 
outcomes in this instance are predicated on the availability of good quality data and best-practice water accounting approaches to 
resource management. Therefore, as our appreciation of the need to incorporate uncertainty/unawareness into public policy grows, 
Fig. 6. Minimum almond g-water requirement calculations.  
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there is an urgent requirement to collect useful data on the minimum (g)-inputs for a range of issues, to implement proper water 
accounting arrangements, and to explore tipping point outcomes including supply or other shocks (e.g. high prices) using SCA 
techniques. 
For example, a current global focus on water-use efficiency investments both privately and publicly to ‘free-up’ scarce water re-
sources for use elsewhere may be pushing systems towards tipping points where previous supply buffers in the system no longer exist; 
reducing total system capacity to cope with future supply shortages. Investments in augmented input storage (e.g. dams and weirs in 
river systems) may also perversely exacerbate these problems by increasing total demand for (g)-inputs under expectations of increased 
reliability and supply capacity [44]. Hence, in the context of real options theory —which looks at trigger prices under a capacity to 
suspend production during periods of unfavourable conditions or avoid investment totally [45]—it may instead be useful to couple 
SCA and benefit-cost analysis (BCA) techniques to explore longer-term investment planning and the impact of shocks on private in-
vestment choices. SCA-BCA combined analysis may provide some capacity to examine minimum input levels (i.e. (h) inputs above 
fixed minimum (g) inputs) needed to achieve NPV ¼ 0 (breakeven) outcomes for investment options. This could increase our capacity 
for evaluating investment choice options to sustain capital or rebound from shock events prior to committing to an investment, and 
should thus feature in future SCA research. 
4.2. Adaptive institutions 
An alternative form of investment assessment, especially for public institutions, may involve the use of transaction costs. Put 
simply, private transaction costs can be thought of as the price of contracting between parties. But at the public policy scale, we can 
define transaction costs as the expenditure required to design, test and administer a public policy together with the costs of monitoring 
performance and altering policy arrangements should it become necessary in future. If we are constrained in our capacity to alter 
future policy, then this is an example of lock-in transition costs. To minimise lock-in costs, and enable institutional arrangements 
capable of coping with future risk/uncertainty, we must identify and develop adaptive public institutions via comparative analysis. 
Theory in support of adaptive institutions has recently emerged [46], and some empirical transaction cost analysis (TCA) in support of 
that theory using ex-post examinations of historic investments and state outcomes has thus far been conducted [47]. More study is 
needed, but at present the capacity to incorporate future risk/uncertainty is limited. 
Thus, similar to the combined research approach discussed above, a coupled SCA-TCA framework (including optimisation and/or 
BCA) could offer similar public policy investment assessment opportunities. Further, adaptive policy ‘ideas’ could also be para-
meterised for inclusion as constraints or other objective functions in the model, and then tested against state outcomes as defined in the 
SCA framework to identify potential policy failure points. This has important implications for public resource managers suggesting that 
this too should feature in future SCA research. 
4.3. Expanded scope as a basis for identifying future risk/uncertainty 
For many contexts these issues will seem distant and challenging; suggesting that they can be safely ignored or delayed due to 
insufficient current evidence or indicators of tipping point thresholds. Yet where insufficient evidence or data in support of robust 
policy/investment choices exists, appropriate decision-making will suffer under an inability to adequately represent and consider risk 
or uncertainty. In such contexts, it may be useful to identify more advanced-stage jurisdictions that have dealt with these issues, to 
determine what lessons could be applied locally. This may highlight: potential transformations toward inflexible future arrangements 
(e.g. policy lock-in [48]), novel arrangements for dealing with future uncertainty/risk, and/or growing requirements for adapta-
tion—especially where risk assessments do not typically feature in current policy assurance review processes. 
An example of this may relate to minimum base flow requirements, as discussed above with respect to conveyance water to deliver 
minimum (g) water, and which may be several multiples of that minimum volume (Fig. 3). Early attempts to address environmental 
water input requirements in Australia focused on planned water, where legislation and regulation was altered to accommodate and 
legally-ensure minimum river flows. While in practice this was somewhat possible in river systems downstream of large dam storage 
facilities, in other areas the absence of river infrastructure has made maintaining minimum system flows in support of ecological 
functions more challenging. This has been highlighted in two recent reports investigating large-scale fish deaths along the Darling 
River system in south-western New South Wales [49,50] where upstream large-scale infrastructure does not exist. Planned water has 
thus been identified as a useful concept within regulated river systems, but of less value outside those areas. 
Further, while market-based reallocations have resulted in the transfer of water to create large quantities of actual environmental 
rights, alternative measures are still needed to supply base flows in unregulated systems. This continues to be a focus of research and 
planning work in Australia with important links to the SCA framework. Ultimately, it may be necessary to install prioritised rights to 
environmental water to ensure that so-called ‘lower’ or temporally newer rights are fully/properly recognised with regard to their 
higher role in providing a fundamental base for water systems; as well as ensuring that other users do not rely on those rights as a 
source of risk-minimisation during low supply states of nature. Instead, it may be necessary to implement greater private risk- 
mitigation responsibilities on consumptive water users as a means of adaptation to future supply uncertainty [45]. This will be 
especially important where consumptive users continue to ignore system limits, tipping point risks, and/or call for access to supply 
under ‘fair share’ principles during low supply periods. 
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4.4. Incentives to act illegally 
As we have seen from the earlier illustrative example, there has been some transformation of land use in Australia where wine-
grapes have reduced their area, and almonds appear to have replaced them. However, while both crops are perennials, they experience 
different water input needs. Winegrapes average approximately 7 ML/ha, while almonds use 14 ML/ha. Thus, while the trans-
formation of land use may be roughly equivalent, the change in water use is not. Putting aside issues of possible future water delivery 
constraints under those changes, it is foreseeable that almond producers faced with supply shortages or shocks may have to pay 
significant future market prices to secure minimum (g)-inputs and avoid irreversible capital loss tipping points—as discussed by 
Adamson et al. [36]. Alternatively, in the context of poor monitoring and compliance arrangements in many of Australia’s river 
systems [51], producers may opt to extract water illegally. Without adequate legal protection and enforcement, all other right owners 
may face considerable risk, along with natural capital and national welfare gains. This would result in a system comprising significant 
winners and losers, consistent with Rothenberg and Smith [26], and increased future uncertainty of sustainable water supply systems 
into the future. Agricultural water theft is not well-studied in the literature, and as such requires further examination and thought with 
regard to risk, uncertainty and unawareness drivers. Contingent upon scale and temporal effects, it may be possible to include as a 
shock parameter in future SCA model analyses. 
4.5. A limitation to consider 
Finally, a word of caution. While we have espoused the value of the SCA framework for representing and incorporating risk/un-
certainty into assessments, it must be noted that the framework presented here assumes a single decision-maker that is possessed of 
perfect foresight—a heroic assumption. But much the same limitations apply to other models that attempt to shed light on these issues 
(e.g. positive-mathematical programming [52] or agent-based models [53]). High-quality data, consultation with stakeholders and 
actual decision-makers, and careful iteration at all development steps of the model may assist to overcome some of these limits. 
However, the realities comprised of problem scale, capacity to represent the full scope of relevant issues, and temporal changes will 
always be at odds with modelled outcomes. Just as mean-variance values have been previously viewed as inadequate representations 
of uncertainty/unawareness, so too the peril of the single number answer when seeking to inform decision-makers. These constraints 
on our capacity to interact with and inform both private and public decision-makers must also feature in our future SCA model 
development and output discussions. As an example, future modelling work may explore over-watering decision-responses based on an 
individual’s multiplicative risk attitudes. 
5. Conclusion 
Future analysis of water resource issues must include strategies for exploring uncertainty. A recent separation of water resource 
inputs into two major functions that protect capital and generate outputs provides a novel insight into adaptation and the rationale for 
decision-making that does not conform to expected utility paradigms (non-convex solutions). The capacity of SCA to model these non- 
convex behavioural responses within each state of nature helps explore what may occur at the farm scale level as individuals reallocate 
water resources in response to alternative supply states. By examining individual actions, industry wide transformations from market 
or policy signals, and the capacity of institutions to respond to expected future states of nature researchers may be able to examine a 
variety of potential tipping points at management/basin-scale levels. 
Within a free market-based economy, many contexts will experience a reduced capacity to use command and control methods to 
constrain production system growth. This will drive an increased requirement to explore and test new policy or program arrangements, 
and their capacity to cope with risky or uncertain outcomes (i.e. their capacity to reduce or address future unawareness about the risk 
to capital). For example, as we struggle with tried and recurring policy/political responses to realised droughts and drought relief, this 
remains an on-going debate. We may be willing to tolerate losses for a period—or even total loss of capital in some cases—although 
repeated requirements to meet increased private debt in the agricultural sector by public funders may test this resolve; especially 
where the incidence of acting as an insurer of last resort grows exponentially under risky and uncertain tipping point outcomes. Such 
repeated bail-out requirements reduce the efficient, sustainable and resilient nature of many local/global objectives. Thus, a greater 
appreciation of future tipping points may be helpful for avoiding such outcomes, reducing total losses, and identifying the juncture at 
which risk-sharing/responsibility must finally shift. 
In this paper we have explored the development of analytical approaches to risk and uncertainty with respect to water investment 
and decision-making assessments, and presented a powerful separation of water inputs into their fundamental roles. While this 
approach may be relevant in other applications (e.g. fishing limits, biosecurity pest impacts, energy limits, environmental watering 
applications) we contend that there is considerable future scope for further research examining the implications of resource separation 
in the water context especially. A range of initial research requirements have been proposed, and where the scarcity of total water 
requirement becomes clearer—and the demand for water grows daily—there is an urgent need to follow these suggestions to inform 
future decision-making across all levels of water use and management. 
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